Cognitive task analysis (CTA) methodologies are used to discover expertise that domain practitioners utilize in order to perform tasks, but are unable to reliably articulate when asked directly. We describe a methodology that walks through a novice's process on a task in order to serve as a probe for elicitation of expert commentary. Six experienced intelligence analysts with three levels of prior knowledge critiqued the process a junior analyst employed to determine the causes and consequences of the Ariane 501 rocket launch failure. Preliminary data analyses reveal interesting insights about the nature of expertise in intelligence analysis. This appears to be a promising alternative methodology for CTA when there are access restrictions, low frequency or unpredictability of target observation events, or difficulty in recruiting experts who wish to be evaluated on their task performance.
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive task analysis (CTA) methodologies are used to discover expertise that domain practitioners utilize in order to perform tasks, but are unable to reliably articulate when asked directly. Specifically, CTAs identify ineffective strategies that lead to poor performance (i.e., a model of mistakes that "novices" make), as well as adaptive strategies that have been developed by highly skilled practitioners to cope with task demands (i.e., a model of "expert" skill).
A number of approaches have been developed for contrasting the performance of highly skilled and less-skilled practitioners, ranging from field studies where practitioners are observed in actual work settings (Hutchins, 1995) ; to critical incident analyses (Klein, Calderwood, and MacGregor, 1989) ; to analyses of performance under simulated conditions (Sarter and Woods, 2000) ; to observation of practitioner performance under highly controlled conditions (Lesgold et al., 1988) . Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages, and can be combined to obtain converging evidence in order to "bootstrap" an understanding of expertise in a domain .
We describe the use of critiquing as a CTA methodology that walks through a novice's process on a task in order to serve as a probe for elicitation of expert commentary. This technique takes advantage of skill in critiquing, which is often conducted by more skilled practitioners in order to train less skilled practitioners, to provide insight into expertise. It is an alternative that can be used when it is not possible to observe work because of access restrictions, low frequency or unpredictability of target observation events, or difficulty in recruiting experts who wish to be evaluated on their task performance. It also allows for estimation of variability because multiple experts can critique a single novice's process.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
The critiquing method was applied to eliciting the nature of expertise in intelligence analysis. Intelligence analysis has many similarities to traditional supervisory control domains. Inferential analysis is a complex task that takes approximately 7 years to be considered an expert, is driven by events, is conducted under time pressure, and involves monitoring the perceived threat for surprise by adversarial nations or terrorist groups. In addition, there are potentially high consequences for failure. For example, on August 7, 1998, the United States was surprised by Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Nigeria. Because no details of the bombing were known prior to the event, 224 people died, including 12 US citizens.
Intelligence analysis, like many other domains, is undergoing changes that stress the ability to meet task demands. While the number of countries and technologies to be monitored for potential threats has greatly increased in the post-Cold war environment, there are also widespread reductions in staff. In addition, at the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC), 30% of the analysts are eligible for retirement in five years. Active duty military and civilian personnel with no prior analysis experience will replace many of these analysts. Military personnel are assigned for 3-4 years, of which the first year is often spent obtaining clearance to work with classified information. Therefore, there is a need to understand the nature of analytic expertise in order to characterize desired skills when hiring analysts, train junior analysts more quickly, and design better support tools.
Several cognitive task analyses (CTAs) have been conducted in intelligence analysis, although few are available in the unclassified literature. Riegler et al. (1997) did a functional task modeling CTA in order to design a workstation to support interpreting measurements and signature intelligence (MASINT) data. Potter et al. (1998) created an abstraction hierarchy for military capability assessment, based on interviews with U. S. Army Intelligence experts.
This research builds upon a CTA of U. S. Air Force intelligence analysts conducted by Patterson et al. (in press) . In that CTA, ten experienced intelligence analysts were observed while responding to a question about the causes and consequences of the failure of the Ariane 501 rocket launch, using a database constructed of 2000 unclassified technical articles. In our CTA, six experienced intelligence analysts similar to the observed study participants critiqued a novice performing the same task with the same support tools. This paper describes the critiquing methodology that was used and preliminary findings from the data analysis.
METHODOLOGY
Six experienced intelligence analysts with three levels of prior knowledge of a task critiqued the process a junior analyst employed to determine the causes and consequences of the Ariane 501 rocket launch failure. The experts' critiques about the novice's analytic process, including judgments of appropriateness, suggestions for change, and descriptions of how the expert would have done things differently, were the focus of the CTA (Figure 1 ).
Figure 1. Focus of Critiquing Method

Data Capture of Novice's Process
A novice's analytic process was captured and then rerepresented during the critiquing session with expert analysts. The novice was a recent college graduate who had worked at the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) for two weeks prior to the exercise and who had not yet been oriented to military intelligence analysis or received a clearance to work with classified information. He described that he had experience writing research papers as part of his college coursework, but otherwise had no prior analytic experience.
The novice was provided with a written question and asked to think aloud while constructing a response to be given to a commander in the form of a video-taped verbal briefing. The question was the same as one used in the Patterson et al. (in press) study: "In 1996, the European Space Agency lost a satellite during the first qualification launch of a new rocket design. Give a short briefing about the basic facts of the incident: when it was, why it occurred, and what the immediate impacts were."
The novice took approximately an hour to perform the analysis. The process was captured by video and audio tape. In addition, screen shots were collected that showed what titles and dates were on the screen when he opened each of the 11 documents he read.
The opened documents and handwritten notes were also collected.
The novice typed in "European Space Agency" as his first search and received 608 hits. He added "lost satellite" to the search terms and received 57 documents. He then limited the search to "European Space Agency" as three words in close proximity by typing "(European Space Agency):%3". This returned 512 documents. He added satellite to the search, which returned 332 documents. At this point, he began iteratively browsing and opening reports based on dates and titles, and conducted no further searches. He spent 7 minutes and 22 seconds browsing titles overall.
He opened 11 documents, 10 of which were unique documents. Overall, he spent 48 minutes and 27 seconds reading documents. He spent the most time reading two documents, one of which was classified as a "high profit" document by investigators in that it was of particularly high quality. While reading the documents, he made notes on the front and back of the sheet with the written question (Figures 2  and 3 ). Immediately prior to giving his verbal briefing, he drew a horizontal line and wrote the notes on the bottom of the back of the sheet. 
Critiquing Session
Six intelligence analysts, identified as expert by the NAIC, participated in individual critiquing sessions (Table 1) . The participants were numbered from 5 to 10 because four pilot sessions were conducted. To explore how prior knowledge influences the critiquing process, two participants were provided with no information about the task prior to the session, two participants were provided with the written question and the documents that the novice read and instructed not to do any further research, and two were provided with that information as well as having a great deal of knowledge about the topic area. In addition, one of these "full knowledge" participants had conducted the same analysis as part of the Patterson et al. (in press ) study. For each category of prior knowledge, one analyst with a relatively narrow technical focus (e.g., jamming devices) and one analyst with a more global focus (e.g., economic impacts) were included. One investigator conducted each critiquing session. First, the written question presented to the novice was read to the expert. Then, the script of the novice's process was "unfolded" with pre-defined pauses to elicit commentary. In addition, the expert was told that he could comment at any time during the session. To allow comparison of comments across experts, three specific questions were asked at predefined times. As the script was read, the screen shots of query results, the documents being reviewed, and a paper "snapshot" that highlighted new notes taken by the novice were shown at coordinated times with the script.
FINDINGS
Protocols were generated from each critiquing session. Each protocol included the script containing naturally generated "embedded probes," such as verbalizations made by the novice that an inference had been made about source reliability, a transcript of verbal critiques, and a transcript of opportunistic questions and responses. Preliminary analyses were conducted using process tracing analysis of responses to the embedded probes (Woods, 1993) .
For example, the novice spent 29 seconds reading document 1583, which was a 534 word report from Guardian Newspapers Limited published July 22, 1996, with the title "ARIANE 5 EXPLOSION: THE VERDICT; The Report." While reading the document, the novice said: "Ariane 5 Explosion. The Verdict. The Report. Probably exactly what I need. Sounds like the one I can read right to them. The **EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE** In 1996, the >European Space Agency@ lost a satellite during the first qualification launch of a new rocket design. Give a short briefing about the basic facts of the incident: when it was, why it occurred, and what the immediate impacts were.
S vh Ã S p x r Ã q r h q Ã T h r Ã X r r x 6 vh rÃ$ Ã 3 Ãr yh pv t During the critiquing session, the investigator showed the dates and titles window that the novice looked at when he opened the document, the document, the time spent reading it, what he said and wrote while reading it, and then paused to elicit commentary. The comments in Table 2 illustrate the richness of comments and variability of topics triggered by this approach. Could have basis in larger problem. Could lead to failure ten years down the line. Being a novice he might have less knowledge of the long-term. 7 I didn't see anything. Verdict generally tells me whose blame, not, no why it happened. 8 One of the things he's correct about is they wouldn't have any analysis done immediately after the event. You have to go beyond the event and work your way back. 9 All this says is they're picking up the pieces. It's literally right after the thing. Okay. 10 The nature of the information, what's the result of an inquiry board, is going to be downstream for a piece. And if something comes out in one article, it ends up getting repeated. Sometimes, the further you get from an event doesn't mean you're going to have better information. Like the Kennedy assassination. It's years and we think we have a better fix on it? Sometimes people fixate on things and they get repeated and repeated. And maybe if we look closer, there might be pieces of information, all kinds of input, some maybe perishable, and it gets stuck somewhere. Sometimes people find it and say 'this is it' and they have the benefit of hindsight. Sometimes setting down a timeline helps. It was written here, but the event was here. What sources did the person use -you might not know but you can make estimates. Like these Malaysian students. In my documents, I wouldn't necessarily make references to where I got the information but sometimes it's apparent. I will have a list of sources in case someone asks.
In addition to pausing at pre-defined times to elicit commentary, three questions were asked of each expert to ensure a response on a particular issue. For example, at one point during the analysis, the novice opened a document and said "It's from a French journal but it's not in French." At this point, the investigator asked "Is language one thing you notice?" The responses to this question revealed many complex subtleties in relation to how a document attribute that is easily recognize by machine processing can provide important insights for different contexts (Table 3) . In addition to analyzing the responses to embedded probes and targeted questions, we grouped critiques by each expert under the categories of 1) information selection, 2) corroborate and resolve conflicts, and 3) story construction. In each critiquing session, there were 17-28 comments distributed across these aspects of analysis (Table 4) . We are in the process of analyzing these comments for patterns as well as looking to see if they reflect a 'community of expertise' which can be combined in different ways to meet different analytic needs. 
DISCUSSION
Cognitive task analysis (CTA) methodologies are used to discover expertise that domain practitioners utilize in order to perform tasks, but are unable to reliably articulate when asked directly. We described a methodology that walked through a novice's process on a task in order to serve as a probe for elicitation of expert commentary. Six experienced intelligence analysts with three levels of prior knowledge critiqued the process a junior analyst employed to determine the causes and consequences of the Ariane 501 rocket launch failure. Preliminary data analyses revealed interesting insights about the nature of expertise in intelligence analysis that have implications for hiring, training, and design.
The critiquing interview appears to be a promising alternative CTA methodology when there are access restrictions, low frequency or unpredictability of target observation events, or difficulty in recruiting experts who do not wish to be evaluated on their task performance. Expert participants appeared to find the session engaging and the novice participant looked forward to receiving feedback from expert analysts about ways to improve his process.
In future research, we plan to capture another novice's process on the same task and have a second critiquing session with the two "full knowledge" participants. This will allow us to explore how dependent the critiques are on the particular novice's process.
